

# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. Negotiations for the Soviet visit to Belgrade were well advanced  not concluded because of Malenkov's removal. The announcement of the visit was a complete surprise to the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav people. Mijalko Todorovic is believed to be playing an important role in the discussions.
2. The USSR leaders hope to accomplish the following:
  - a. Furnish proof that they respect the independence of other countries. This is intended as proof that they would respect German neutrality and independence.
  - b. Eliminate the possibility of Yugoslav military bases for NATO.
  - c. Reduce the possibility of war in the near future.
  - d. Provide a propaganda basis for the USSR's intent to promote peace even if it were necessary to sacrifice their prestige to preserve coexistence.
  - e. Confuse the Western Powers, especially the U.S., regarding the real intent of USSR foreign policy.
3. Tito is to receive the following benefits from the visit:
  - a. Financial aid;

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- b. Assistance in the reorganization of Yugoslav internal economy and expansion of Yugoslav foreign trade;
  - c. Guidance in the reorganization of the inefficient Yugoslav internal administration and strengthening of controls over non-Communists;
  - d. Possibility of the establishment of a federation of South Slav states, including Bulgaria.
4. The Balkan Pact is not affected, as it is already without substance and has no real significance. The Pact will be preserved to enable Yugoslavia to maintain its role in international politics and as a cover for intelligence activities.
5. In addition to the receipt of the above benefits, Tito is motivated by the following: and hierarchy.
- a. The conviction that there will be no more Western aid without Yugoslav military and political concessions;
  - b. The conviction that granting concessions to the West will endanger Yugoslavia and expose it to Eastern attacks in the event of war;
  - c. The need for neutrality, since the Tito regime would be destroyed if it sided with any belligerent.
6. Indications are that no public parades or receptions are planned because of Yugoslav fear of Cominformist demonstrations.

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